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Statute of Limitations in Malpractice Actions
Ernest A. Cieslinski *
T HE ILL-TREATED patient has sought redress for medical mal-
practice by actions that sound in tort,' in contract,2 or
in fraud.3 As with other actions, the underlying policy of
"peace and repose" of all statutes of limitations dictates that these
actions be timely.4 In Ohio, for example, the time limit for an
action for malpractice is one year.
5
From the physician's viewpoint, such imposed time limit
is justified as a means of assuring reliable evidence. 6 Thus fair-
ness to the physician demands that the plaintiff should com-
mence his action within a reasonable time.
On the other hand, the wronged patient certainly should
have ample time to assert his claim. Indeed, possibly this
would be a better basis for malpractice limitations statutes.
7
Superficially, a one year period of limitations does not seem to be
extremely rigorous on the patient. However, Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chemical Corporation illustrates the potential harsh-
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College.
1 41 Am. Jur., Physicians & Surgeons, Par. 123.
2 74 A. L. R. 1317 (1931); Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515, 171 So. 320 (1936);
Menefee v. Alexander, 107 Ky. 279, 538 S. W. 653 (1899); Burke v. Maryland,
149 Minn. 491, 184 N. W. 32 (1921); Yeager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wash. 2d 559,
124 P. 2d 755 (1946).
3 Swankowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N. E. 2d 182 (1953), where
the court held that the complaint set up a cause of action in malpractice,
and that the allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional con-
cealment did not change the action to one of deceit; and see Acton v. Mor-
rison, 62 Ariz. 139, 155 P. 2d 782 (1945); Crossett Health Center v. Croswell,
221 Ark. 874, 256 S. W. 2d 548 (1953); Procter v. Schomberg, 63 So. 2d 68
(Fla. 1953); Scaffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 688, 86 S. E. 2d 649 (1955);
Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N. C. 363, 98 S. E. 2d 508 (1957); Hinkle v. Hargens,
81 N. W. 2d 888 (S. D. 1957).
4 Note, 27 Albany L. R. 312, 315 (1963).
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11, which provides, "an action for ... or mal-
practice . . . shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof
accrued.
6 Supra, n. 4.
7 The general rule that knowledge of the harm is immaterial in determining
when the limitation begins to run is based upon the assumption that in most
cases a delinquent plaintiff will be aware of the injury within the statutory
period. Note, Developments in Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. R.
1177 (1950).
8 12 N. Y. 2d 1073; 190 N. E. 2d 253 (1963) (memo. op.); 12 N. Y. 2d 212, 188
N. E. 2d 142 (1963); noted, 30 Bklyn. L. R. 158 (1963).
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ness of such a time limitation. In that case the injury was a slow
and hidden reaction to an internal injection. Three years elapsed
before the patient discovered the resultant injury. No prudent
observer could have discovered the injury sooner. However, it
was held that the statute of limitations had run, barring an
action for malpractice and leaving the innocent plaintiff remedi-
less. Since such injured patient has no way of protecting him-
self, arguments favoring leniency appear in court opinions as
well as in legal writings.9
Ameliorating Movements
Many jurisdictions have avoided such a harsh result by
advancing the date when the period of limitation begins to run.
Thus, one can find holdings, theories and doctrines extending the
starting day from the time of the act of malpractice,O to one of
the following: the time of injury; 11 the last day of successive
contributing injury; 12 the end of continuous treatment; 13 the
9 See Truxel v. Goodman, 49 N. E. 2d 569 (Ohio App. 1942), in which the
majority opinion stated, "We sympathize with the earnestness with which
council for plaintiff argues the justness of his client's case. He says that he
has no quarrel with the legislation in its enactments, but rather with the
construction given to the section by the courts. Certainly council would not
expect us to reverse the Supreme Court. . . . We volunteer the suggestion
that we think some changes should very properly be made." See also Gress,
Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 16 St. John's L. R. 101, 103
(1941), wherein it was stated "A plaintiff can bring an action for malprac-
tice only if he had become fortunate enough to discover the wrong within
two years after its commission."
10 Supra, note 1 at 233, stating that the statute of limitation on acts of mal-
practice ordinarily runs in favor of the physician or surgeon from the time
of the negligent act, rather than the time of the consequential injury.
Fronce v. Nicholes, 12 Circ. Dec. 472, 22 C. C. R. 539 (1901), in a clear
and concise opinion, sustains the rule that the statute commences to run
when the injurious act complained of is perpetrated or accomplished.
Also, Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N. E. 653, 654-655 (1919);
Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P. 2d 797 (1949), 74 A. L. R. 1317
(1931) supplemented 144 A. L. R. 209 (1943); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App.
Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1930), affd. 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930);
Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N. J. 58, 77 A. 2d 240 (1950); Shearin v. Lloyd,
supra, note 3.
11 Golia v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N. Y., 7 N. Y. 2d 931, 165 N. E. 2d
578 (1960). Bernath v. LeFeuer, 325 Pa. 43, 189 A. 342 (1937), in which it
was said that it is too well established to require extensive discussion that
the statute of limitations runs from the time of injury even though the
damage may not have been known.
12 Gross v. Wise, 16 App. Div. 2d 682, 227 N. Y. S. 2d 523, 80 A. L. R. 368
(Supp. 1962). Wherein the court held that the last alleged act of mal-
practice accrued beyond the two years statute of limitations, and although
subsequent treatment was applied thirty nine times, since no claim was
(Continued on next page)
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LIMITATIONS IN MALPRACTICE
termination of continuous surgeon-patient relationship; 14 and
the day of discovery or when a diligent person would have dis-
covered the malpractice. 15
In general, compassion for the innocent patient has produced
a tendency toward allowing sufficient time to bring an action.
In some states the progress is slow.16 Other jurisdictions have
maximized patient protection by tolling the statute until the in-
jury is discovered.17
The Continuous Treatment Theory
Ohio has been cited as the leader of the movement to broad-
en the construction of malpractice statutes by tolling the statute
until continuous treatment terminates.' The leading case is
Gillette v. Tucker,19 in which the syllabus reads:
Where the physician operates upon the patient, for what he
pronounces to be appendicitis and neglects or carelessly for-
gets to remove from the abdominal cavity, a sponge which
he had placed therein, and closes the incision, with the
sponge remaining therein, and this condition continues
during his entire professional relationship to the case and
(Continued from preceding page)
made that such treatment was improper, the action was barred. Also, Hotel-
ling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P. 2d 944 (1942), 144 A. L. R. 205 (1943).
13 See Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio Op. 361, 363, 124 N. E. 238, 240 (1919),
which held that "termination of treatment does not necessarily mean formal
discharge. The physician need only have ceased to treat as to the particular
injury or malady in question."
DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N. E. 2d 177 (1952); Guy v.
Schuldt, 138 N. E. 2d 891 (Ind. 1956); Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35
N. W. 2d 351 (1949); Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (1949),
affd. 275 App. Div. 1043, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 924 (1950); Sly v. Van Lengen, 120
Misc. 420, 198 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1923); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N. W.
2d 121 (1941).
14 Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865, 93 Am. St. Rep. 639
(1902); Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962); Ham-
mer v. Rosen, 7 N. Y. 2d 376, 165 N. E. 2d 756, 198 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (1960);
Schmitt v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N. W. 622 (1931); Couillard v. Charles
T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N. W. 2d 96 (1948).
15 Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 761, 270 P. 2d 1 (1954).
16 See Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363 Mich. 676, 110 N. W. 2d 731 (1961), where
the court concluded by saying "we feel compelled to limit our application
here of the last treatment rule to the facts of this case. By so saying, we
reserve for further consideration applicability of the discovery rule urged
upon us by plaintiff for a case which presents a factual situation more
appealing than that presented here."
17 Stafford v. Schultz, supra note 15; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 69
Sup. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282 (1949).
18 Note, Malpractice-Statute of limitations-Plaintiff's cause of action held
not to have accrued until end of continuous treatment, 37 St. John's L. R.
385 (1963).
19 See supra, note 14.
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is present when he abandons or otherwise retires therefrom,
the statute of limitations does not commence to run against
a right to sue and recover on account of such want of skill,
care and attention, until the case has been so abandoned, or
the professional relation otherwise terminated.
McArthur v. Bowers20 reversed the Gillette decision. How-
ever, in 1919 in Bowers v. Santee,2 1 the court again held that
the relationship arises out of contract and the statute of limita-
tions begins to run when the contract relationship is termi-
nated. The surgeon-patient relationship arose out of a contract
in which the doctor expressly or impliedly agreed to exercise the
average degree of skill of members of the same profession. Con-
sequently, the statute of limitation did not begin to run until
after termination of such agreement by an ending of treat-
ment. It should be noted, however, that the relevant time is
termination of treatment for the particular malady.2 2 A surgeon-
patient relationship continued for other reasons will not be
considered as part of the same contract.
DeLong v. Campbel 23 expanded this theory somewhat by
stating that the surgeon also owed the duty of subsequent treat-
ment necessary to a reasonable and substantial recovery. This
duty to follow up for a reasonable time means that there is no
clear-cut rule to determine the date of the last act related to a
specific contracted treatment. Since reasonable minds may differ
as to when the statute should thus begin to run, it should be de-
cided by a jury.24
The recent case of Lundberg v. Bay View Hospital25 further
expands the Continuous Treatment Theory. A woman entered
the hospital. A pathologist who had been represented as em-
ployed by the hospital improperly diagnosed the patient's con-
dition. Two other doctors working at the same hospital actually
performed a needless hysterectomy due to this mistaken diag-
nosis. The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
in an action against the hospital was tolled until the patient
20 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N. E. 1128 (1905).
21 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N. E. 238 (1919).
22 Id. at 363, where it was stated that "termination of treatment does not
necessarily mean formal discharge. The physician need only have ceased
to treat as to the particular injury or malady in question."
23 See supra, note 13.
24 Pump v. Fox, 113 Ohio App. 150, 17 Ohio Ops. 2d 129, 177 N. E. 2d 520
(1961).
25 175 Ohio St. 133 (1963).
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severed her hospital relationship. Thus the doctrine of con-
tinuous treatment was extended to cover hospital malpractice.
Discovery Doctrine
However far the continuous treatment doctrine is expanded,
it clearly cannot help many victims of medical malpractice. For
example, in DeLong v. Campbell26 an operation in 1942 was
performed negligently in that a portion of a surgical sponge was
left inside the patient's body. The sponge was found in 1948 by
another surgeon. As mentioned earlier, the continuous treat-
ment doctrine barred recovery.
More is needed to prevent injustice. Possibly the best cure
is the discovery doctrine. Basically, this doctrine will toll the
statute until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his
injury.27  Several states have written it into their statutes.2s
Others have adopted it by judicial construction. California, for
example, holds that the one year period of limitation for mal-
practice does not start to run until the date of discovery of the
wrongful act or the date when by the exercise of reasonable
diligence the act should have been discovered.29 The words
"exercise of reasonable diligence" do not require the patient to
doubt and challenge his physician, in whom he should have com-
plete confidence during treatment. 30
Other jurisdictions have adopted the discovery doctrine. 31
Michigan, which follows the last treatment approach, may soon
swing over to the discovery approach as well. The majority court
opinion stated, in the case of Eschenbacher v. Hier,3 2 that they
26 See supra, note 13.
27 Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 176 P. 2d 745 (1954).
28 See e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516, 100 (1952). See also Lillich, The Mal-
practice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47
Cornell L. Q. 344, 359 (1962).
29 Huysman v. Kirch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P. 2d 908 (1936); see also 80 A. L. R.
2d 368 (1961).
30 Stafford v. Schultz, supra note 15; Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App. 2d 11,
18 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962).
31 See, e.g. Perrin v. Rodriquez, 153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934); Thatcher v.
Detar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S. W. 2d 160 (1943); McFarland v. Connally, 252
S. W. 2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); City of Miami v. Brooks, 170 So. 2d
306 (Fla. 1954); Davies v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P. 2d 982 (1957);
Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 382, 154 A. 2d 788 (1959); Nowell v. Hamilton, 249
N. C. 523, 107 S. E. 2d 112 (1959); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N. W.
2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N. J. 434, 173 A. 2d 277 (1961); Seitz
v. Jones, 370 P. 2d 300 (Okla. 1962).
32 See supra, note 16.
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are holding such a change in abeyance, waiting for a good set of
circumstances in which to test the discovery doctrine.
DeLong v. Campbell, in no uncertain terms, rejected the
use of the discovery doctrine in Ohio.3 3 The court felt its func-
tion to be to declare what legislative enactments say and not to
determine what they ought to say; any injustice to be cured
by the General Assembly.
Directly contrary reasoning is set forth in Ayers v. Morgan,
34
wherein the discovery doctrine was supported in Pennsylvania
notwithstanding the absence of a legislative enactment. While
courts will not inquire into the wisdom of a statute, neverthe-
less they will interpret the statutes so as to include essential
constitutional requirements. The discovery doctrine must be
adopted for without it the statute of limitations would be un-
constitutional. The patient, unable to learn of his injury until
after the period of limitation had expired, would be left with-
out a remedy and without due process of law.
This doctrine is still a minority view, although its ad-
herents seem to be growing. Even where not adopted by the
majority, it appears in the dissenting opinion of some cases.35
In addition, favorable dissertations can be found in many law
reviews.36
While Ohio has not yet applied the discovery doctrine in
malpractice cases, the date of discovery is important in other
limitation cases. For example, it is used in cases of fraud,3 7
as well as in cases of trespass.3s Furthermore, a recent Ohio per-
sonal injury case held that the statute of limitations was tolled
until diagnosis of the injury was established.39
33 Supra, note 13.
34 397 Pa. 382, 154 A. 2d 788 (1959).
35 See Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 682-683, 277 P, 2d 724, 728
(1954), wherein it was stated, "to say that the patient had a cause of action
all the while, although no one knew about it or suspected it, may meet
some tests of legal logic or theory; but the result would hardly meet the
tests of abstract, generally applicable, or lay standard of justice"; DeLong v.
Campbell, supra, note 13.
36 See, e.g., Lillich, supra note 28; Notes, 37 St. John's L. Rev. 385 (1963);
Gress, supra note 9; 21 St. John's L. Rev. 77, 79 (1946); 11 W. Res. L. Rev.
299, 301 (1960).
37 Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.09.
38 Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 79 Ohio App. 371, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 203, 73
N. E. 2d 137 (1947).
39 Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F. 2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960).
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